An actor has no duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent the third person from causing physical harm to another, unless a special relation exists between the actor and the third person or between the actor and the other.  Thus, the factor of foreseeability alone has no basis for holding a landowner liable for harm from a fire caused by third parties to a neighboring landowner in the absence of a “special relationship”.

Accordingly, it has been held that neither a landlord nor his/her tenant owed a duty to protect an adjoining property owner from fire showing the lack of actual prior knowledge if the fire was started by an unrelated third party.

In Scully v. Fitzgerald[i], a commercial tenant claimed that the landlord breached the duty of maintaining a safe property by keeping an open storage area with construction debris in a dangerous manner.  The tenant claimed that the landlord was aware that tenants discarded cigarette butts in direct proximity to those flammable materials which can create a substantial fire hazard.  Court observed that the tenant was entitled to prove that the landlord had acted unreasonably in maintaining the storage knowing that his tenants discarded cigarettes that can ignite flammable materials.  Court added that it is the duty of the landlord to protect his tenants.

In United Prods. Corp. of Am. v. Atlas Auto Parts[ii], the appellant was a building materials supplier and conducted the business next to an automobile salvage yard which belonged to the respondent.  Appellant installed heavier fencing and motion detectors because of the problems with intruders and thieves.  Respondent claimed that such measures were not feasible because it was merely a lessee.  Vandals caused fire in respondent’s junkyard that resulted in the spreading of fire to appellant’s property.  Appellant filed a negligence action against respondent and court found there was no special relationship to create a duty to control the vandals because respondent had no ability to control them or protect against the harm.  The court added that the respondent had no common law duty to maintain the property of the appellant from harm.

[i] 179 N.J. 114 (N.J. 2004)

[ii] 529 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)